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This paper makes three contributions. First, it presents a new conceptualization and 
measurement of outsider-status, which is based on social class and which takes into account 
that the category of outsiders is composed differently in different countries, depending on labor 
markets and welfare states. Second, it argues theoretically and shows empirically that the class-
based measure of insider-and outsider status has a stronger explanatory power with regard to 
individual-level welfare preferences than the measure based on labor market status. And third, it 
demonstrates empirically that dualization, combined with skill-levels, shapes people’s 
preferences with regard to different welfare policies: Outsiders have stronger preferences for 
redistribution and for social investment than insiders. The analyses are based on micro-level 
ISSP data.  
 
 
Résumé :   
Cet article propose trois types d’apports à la littérature. Tout d’abord, il présente une nouvelle 
conceptualisation et une nouvelle mesure du statut d’outsider, basée sur la classe sociale et 
prenant en compte que la catégorie des outsiders est composée différemment dans différents 
pays en fonction des marchés du travail et des Etats providence. Ensuite, il défend 
théoriquement et démontre empiriquement l’idée selon laquelle cette mesure du statut 
d’outsider et d’insider basée sur la classe sociale a un pouvoir explicatif plus grand en ce qui 
concerne les préférences individuelles en matière deprotection sociale que les mesures basées 
sur la position sur le marché du travail. Enfin, il démontre de façon empirique que le phénomène 
de dualisation, combiné au niveau de compétences, détermine les préférences des individus en 
ce qui concerne les différentes politiques sociales : les outsiders ont des préférences plus 
marquées pour la redistribution et pour l’investissement social que les insiders. Ces analyses 
s’appuient sur des données ISSP de niveau micro. 
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Labor markets, family structures and welfare states in the Western democracies have changed 
profoundly over the last few decades. Across all countries, there is a common trend towards a 
dualization of the workforce: ever fewer people’s work biographies correspond to the industrial 
blueprint of stable, full-time and fully insured insider employment, while a growing proportion of 
the population is in employment relations and experiences employment biographies, which 
deviate from the standard model. For individuals with non-standard work and work biographies, 
this deviation may result in specific risks of poverty and welfare losses. The structure of labor 
markets and welfare states influence this allocation of risks, thereby creating insiders – who 
enjoy the entire range of economic and social rights – and outsiders – who are penalized in 
terms of economic and social rights.  
Research in labor market economics dealing with insider/outsider divides has mostly focused on 
the immediate economic preferences of individuals in the labor market. A growing literature in 
political science and comparative political economy, however, is asking whether this labor 
market dualization is actually (becoming) a real social and political dualization. Do insiders want 
different things politically? Do they have diverging policy or party preferences? Is there a new 
socio-structural conflict, which may eventually be mobilized by parties and collective actors and 
thereby structure politics and policies in the long run? Are the Western developed democracies 
even heading towards a new social cleavage, dividing the A-from the B-team (Esping-Andersen, 
1999) of post-industrial economies? Social cleavages are the strongest and deepest conflict 
lines that structure politics. For a conflict to be a cleavage, it takes a socio-structural basis, the 
collective identity of the social groups involved, and the political mobilization of these social 
groups (Bartolini, Mair, 1990). This paper deals with the first two elements: The socio-structural 
basis of dualization and the preferences of the insiders and outsiders.  
Usually, insiders and outsiders are distinguished on the basis of their current employment 
status. The validity of definitions and measurements of concepts always depends on the specific 
research question one investigates. If one is interested in labor market processes, the 
conceptualization on the basis of employment status indeed meets its analytical purpose.  
 
However, if we are interested in politics, i.e. preferences and mobilization, we need to 
conceptualize insiders and outsiders on the basis of social and economic characteristics that 
are relatively stable and impact the opportunities and constraints of these individuals over a 
longer time span. In addition, we need to identify those individuals who actually experience 
disadvantages. In this paper, we therefore propose a new conceptualization and measurement 
of the insider-outsider distinction in terms of socio-structural classes, and we integrate the 
effects of different welfare regimes in the operationalization. We then compare the explanatory 
power of our concept of insider and outsider to the standard conceptualization and 
measurement of these categories in terms of the current labor market status of individuals, such 
as unemployment or temporary employment. On a theoretical  level, we argue that class or 
occupational profiles are more relevant for the formation of policy-preferences than labor market 
status, because occupations are more stable. According to class theory, they strongly contribute 
to people’s social identity and political preferences. Labor market status, by contrast, can 
change more quickly. On the empirical level, we show that our measurement has a stronger 
explanatory power with regard to individual-level welfare state preferences.  
This new conceptualization of insiders and outsiders is the main contribution we want to make in 
this paper, and it can be located on the side of our independent variables. However, we also 
l economy, we need to conceptualize welfare preferences – the 
carefully than merely in terms of more vs. less welfare. Post-
argue that in a post-industria
dependent variable – more 
                                                        
1 We would like to thank David Rueda and the participants of the Conference „The Dualization of European Societies“ 
(Oxford, April 23rd to 25th 2009) for helpful comments on a previous related paper.  
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industrial societies are structured by a range of different conflict lines and old solidarities have 
weakened (Häusermann, 2010). The “working class” cannot be expected to hold homogeneous 
preferences anymore. Consequently, we argue that different social groups privilege different 
“welfare models”, depending on insider/outsider-status and skill-levels. The conceptualization of 
these welfare models is the contribution we make with regard to the dependent variable.  
The paper is structured as follows. In a first part, we develop our theoretical argument regarding 
the analytical necessity to conceptualize insiders and outsiders in terms of typically atypical 
employment biographies and actual disadvantage. We operationalize different socio-structural 
outsider potentials and, drawing on our previous work (Häusermann, Schwander, 2009), 
propose a “map of dualization” that guides our measurement. In a second part, we propose a 
series of hypotheses regarding the expected welfare preferences of high-and low-skilled 
insiders and outsiders. After a section presenting the data, the operationalization and the 
methodological approach, we test our arguments empirically in two steps: section three 
compares the explanatory value of our measure of insiders/outsiders to the measure commonly 
used in the literature so far, and section four explores the welfare preferences of high-and low-
skilled insiders and outsiders in more detail.  
 
 
1. Theory: The dualization of post-industrial societies  
 
In this section, we present our conceptualization of insiders and outsiders and we develop 
hypotheses on their policy preferences.  
 
Who are the outsiders? The heterogeneous B-team of post-industrial labor markets  
Over the last 30 years, the industrial economies of the developed world have transitioned to the 
era of post-industrialism, with ever growing shares of the workforce being employed in the third 
sector. Much of the literature characterizes the industrial era of Western societies and 
economies as “the golden age”, since it was characterized by relatively stable families and 
stable labor markets (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The exceptional economic growth during the 
three post-war decades allowed for full employment, the development of the Western welfare 
states, a relatively high degree of status homogenization (at least in continental and northern 
Europe) and a high level of generalized social peace between organized labor and capital.  
Three structural developments have, however, profoundly altered this “industrial equilibrium”: 
the tertiarization of the employment structure, the educational revolution and the feminization of 
the workforce (Oesch, 2006, chapter 2). The rise of the service sector -as a result of 
technological change and productivity gains in the industry, the saturation of product markets, 
the rise of the welfare state and the expansion of female employment -is a major trend in all 
OECD countries. After 2000, service sector employment outdid industrial employment 
throughout the OECD by a factor of 2 to 3 (Oesch, 2006: 31). Jobs in the service sector differ 
from industrial employment, because they are either very low-skilled or high-skilled, and 
because service sector employment has a lower potential for productivity gains (Iversen, Wren, 
1998). The educational revolution - as the second structural change of the post-industrial era - 
denotes the massive expansion of tertiary education throughout the OECD-countries, leading to 
a broader and more heterogeneous middle class. Finally, the increasing feminization of the 
workforce is both a consequence of and a driver for the educational revolution and tertiarization. 
The massive entry of women into paid labor is also related to the increasing instability of 
traditional family structures (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
What is crucial for this article is that this shift towards post-industrial employment leads to labor 
markets in which unemployment and formerly “atypical” employment relations become more 
and more widespread and – for some social categories such as women in continental Europe – 
they become even the typical employment pattern (Standing, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1999b). 
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Atypical employment denotes all employment-relations that deviate from the standard industrial 
model of full-time, stable, fully protected and insured employment
2. All atypical employment is 
potentially precarious. The reason for this is that atypical employment was simply not the norm 
and not taken into account in the development of the post-war employment and welfare 
regimes. Therefore, all atypically employed are potential outsiders
3, because non-standard work 
tends to lead to incomplete and insufficient social rights. The potential outsider-status of any 
kind of atypical work is particularly obvious in continental Europe (van Kersbergen, 1995), but 
social insurance in all welfare regimes is systemically inadequate for atypical work, the best 
example being pension schemes based on life-long individual contributions (Myles, 1984: 135).  
However, the typicality or atypicality of people’s work biographies denotes only potential 
dualization: people in non-standard employment are potential outsiders. Most of the existing 
literature on insiders and outsiders indeed takes the current labor market status at a particular 
point in time (such as “the unemployed” or “part-time employed”) as the basis for the 
categorization of insiders and outsiders (e.g. Lindbeck, Snower 2001; St. Paul, 2002; 
Emmenegger, 2009; Rueda 2005; 2006). In contrast to this literature, we argue that it does not 
suffice to look at the employment status of an individual to tell whether he or she can reasonably 
be expected to hold outsider-preferences for mainly two reasons. The first reason is linked to 
the instability of the employment status. The labor market status can be highly variable – too 
variable to affect an individual’s political preferences (see Emmenegger, 2009, for a similar 
argument). Indeed, if people repeatedly move back and forth between standard and non-
standard employment, i.e. if post-industrial societies are fluid and mobile, new employment 
patterns must not result in socio-structural patterns, at all. And if there are no patterns of 
advantage/disadvantage, we cannot expect new patterns of preferences. Therefore, we argue in 
this paper in favor of a conceptualization of outsiders that is based on occupational profiles. 
Occupational categories or classes reflect the typicality or atypicality of employment 
biographies. They should therefore measure permanent, structural disadvantages more reliably. 
Two examples may make the distinction between these two measures clearer: there may be 
outsiders who are in stable employment during one period of their life, but have generally highly 
volatile employment biographies across their life course. Many women e.g. may be employed 
full-time at a young age, but most of them will experience periods of career interruption or 
atypical employment later on, and they are generally well aware of this, meaning that the 
anticipation of future atypical employment will shape their attitudes and preferences. 
Conversely, the unemployed in thriving economic sectors, e.g., know quite well that a short 
period of unemployment will not affect their overall earnings-capacity in the long run. 
Categorizing them as outsiders would be a mistake, because unemployment has different 
consequences for them as compared to long-term unemployed or non employed individuals. In 
sum, our argument is that people form identities and preferences not  on the basis of a 
momentary labor market status, but with regard to their general occupational profile, and this is 
what we need to grasp if we want to talk about the social and political relevance of dualization. 
Therefore, we have to rely on employment biographies instead of the current labor market 
status. We will argue below that post-industrial class theory holds the adequate conceptual tools 
to identify these employment biographies.  
                                                        
2 Part-time and temporary employment contracts are among the most prominent types of atypical employment, and 
they have grown massively over the last two decades. According to Standing (1993: 433), the number of workers on 
temporary contracts across the entire European Union, for instance, has been growing by 15-20% annually since the 
1980s, which is about ten times the overall rate of employment growth (see also Esping-Andersen, 1999). Similarly, 
part-time employment counted for close to 80% of the net job creation in the EU since the mid-1990s (Plougmann, 
2003).  
3 Early works on the insider outsider divide (mostly in labor economics) based their distinction on 
employment/unemployment only (Lindbeck, Snower 2001; St. Paul 1998, 2002). Rueda (2005; 2006) was among the 
first to also include temporary and involuntary part-time employment in the conceptualization of outsiders (see also 
Davidsson, Naczyk, 2009, for an extensive discussion of this literature).  
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The second reason why the employment status alone does not tell us whether an individual 
should be considered as an insider or an outsider is that not all potential outsiders are also 
actual  outsiders. As we have extensively discussed and shown elsewhere (Häusermann, 
Schwander, 2009), different welfare states and labor markets hold different opportunities for 
potential outsiders. Not all socio-structural outsider groups fare equally badly in all countries or 
welfare regimes. Hence, if we want to explore political relevance of this distinction, we have to 
take welfare states into account, and we have to identify the actual winners and losers of post-
industrialism in different countries.
4  
The upshot of this section is that we must go beyond labor market status in the 
conceptualization of the insider outsider divide. This is what we will do in the next section.  
 
The map of dualization: identifying outsiders and insiders on the basis of class  
In the previous section, we explained that snapshot measures of outsider status based on 
unemployment or atypical work (as used e.g. by Lindbeck, Snower 2001; St. Paul, 2002; 
Emmenegger, 2009; Rueda, 2005) may be problematic for the analysis of dualization. What we 
propose here is a different approach: we identify socio-structural groups that share attributes in 
terms of class, gender and age, and we verify whether they are indeed disadvantaged in a 
specific labor market and welfare regime. If they are disadvantaged, they are considered 
outsiders, otherwise they are considered insiders. Let us explain briefly why class, gender and 
age are the relevant criteria (for a more detailed discussion, see Häusermann, Schwander, 
2009).  
Why class? Classes are socio-structural groups characterized by a particular situation in the 
production process, which is supposed to shape their resources, latent interests and 
preferences.
5 Class schemes are usually based on occupational profiles (Erikson, Goldthorpe, 
1993; Wright, 1997; Oesch, 2006), because people in similar professions/occupations tend to 
have similar employment biographies, meaning that classes are characterized by “social 
closure”. Hence, class is a worthwhile starting point for the identification of categories of workers 
of which we would expect similar political preferences. However, the traditional class schemes 
are of limited use for the analysis of dualization, because they reflect the industrial labor market. 
Thereby, these traditional class-schemes neglect that post-industrialization have deeply 
transformed the class structure (Kriesi, 1998; Oesch, 2006) by broadening both the middle class 
on the one hand, and by differentiating the  
Oesch (2006) has developed a class scheme that accounts for post-industrial labor market 
stratification. The scheme is constructed along two dimensions: the vertical dimension 
measures the extent of marketable skills, while the type of work being done is measured along 
the horizontal dimension. The vertical axis has four levels of marketable skills: the higher the 
skill-volume, the more advantages an occupation presents in terms of income and work 
autonomy. The horizontal dimension represents people’s “work logic”, i.e. whether a job relies 
mainly on technical competences, managerial power, face-to-face interaction with clients, or 
self-employment. Technical occupations can be found mostly in the first and second sectors, 
whereas the interpersonal work logic is generally concentrated in service employment. Table 1 
shows how the 15 classes can be summarized into five post-industrial class groups (Kitschelt, 
Rehm, 2005)
6: capital accumulators (CA), mixed service functionaries (MSF), low service 
functionaries (LSF), blue collar workers (BC) and sociocultural professionals (SCP).  
 
                                                        
4 Similarly, Esping-Andersen (1999) and Huber, Stephens (2006) argue that the new divides differ across welfare 
regimes: Low-skilled workers and employees in the low-end service labor market are worst off in the liberal countries 
,whereas women and the young are particularly at risk in continental Europe. 
5 Oesch (2006) advocates a pragmatic use of the notoriously contested concept of class: „class is simply referred to 
as a proxy for similarity in the position within the occupational system.“ (2006: 13). We share this definition that 
eludes the normative discussions and implications of the concept of class. 
6 The original classification is based on ISCO-4d codes, and the summary of five classes relies on ISCO-2d codes. 
See table 1a in the appendix for the codes.  S. Häusermann, H. Schwander – Who are the outsiders and what do they want? 
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Table 1: The post-industrial class scheme  
 
 
Capital accumulators are higher-grade managers, employers, self-employed in liberal 
professions (physicians, lawyers etc.) and technical experts. They are highly skilled and tend to 
work in private industries or services. Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals, by contrast tend to 
work in non-profit or public organizations, or in the service sector. They are typically employed 
in client-interactive jobs (teachers, counselors, nurses, librarians etc.). On the low-skilled side, 
there is an important distinction between blue-collar workers and low service functionaries. The 
low-skilled service workers are frequently employed in private and public services, retail 
commerce, restaurants and other private services, whereas blue-collar workers concentrate in 
private crafts and industry (metal industry, chemistry, mining and construction etc.). Finally, 
Mixed service functionaries are a residual category, ranging from office clerks to associate 
professionals in private industries. Capital accumulators and mixed service functionaries 
encompass mostly standard occupations, but blue-collar workers might be more fragile 
depending on the labor market and socio-cultural professionals and low service functionaries 
concentrate in the service sector, where atypical work and precarious work is more widespread. 
So, one would expect these three categories to be more likely to be among the actual outsiders.  
Even these three categories, however, are too heterogeneous to be categorized entirely as 
insiders or outsiders. We do know from the literature that gender and age matter in the 
structuring of labor market advantages and disadvantages. Much of the relevant literature on 
dualization points to the fact that the insider-outsider divide is clearly gendered (Esping-
Andersen, 1999b: 308; Taylor-Gooby, 1991; Kitschelt, Rehm, 2006; Häusermann, Schwander, 
2009) and that research on dualization must be linked to research on gender segregated labor 
markets (Davidsson, Naczyk, 2009: 5). Age is also an important variable when talking about 
dualization trends. Some studies point out the fact that young workers are confronted with a 
more insecure, volatile labor market, whereas older workers enjoy more stability and job 
protection (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Kitschelt, Rehm 2006; Chauvel, 2006). Consequently, we 
further distinguish the socio-structural classes according to gender and age.
7  
                                                        
7 One may, of course, ask why we disaggregate for gender and age and not for other variables, such as migration, 
sector or skill specificity, which were all shown to have an impact on the labor market chances of individuals 
(Emmenegger, Careja, 2009; Gottschall, Kro0s, 2009; Iversen, Soskice, 2001). We would argue that skill specificity 
and sector are included to some extent in the class-measure. Migration is not key for our research question, since we 
are interested in the political preferences and ultimately in the political mobilization of these groups S. Häusermann, H. Schwander – Who are the outsiders and what do they want? 
















































































Of course, and as theoretically argued above, the different groups do not fare equally well or 
equally badly in all countries and all regimes. Based on our previous work (Häusermann, 
Schwander, 2009), we have developed a map of actual outsiders and insiders across the 
different welfare regimes. Table 2 classifies socio-structural groups on the basis of the following 
criteria: The individuals of a group are considered outsiders if the group-average exceeds the 
regime-average significantly on two of the three following indicators: atypical employment, part-
time employment and unemployment
8 (see appendix 2 for details, results in appendix 3). This 
means that young female socio-cultural professionals, for instance, are considered outsiders if 
they have a significantly higher chance of being unemployed, atypically employed or part-time 
employed than the average member of the workforce in a particular regime. Regime-differences 
are not blatant, but one can see that dualization is clearly structured by age in the Southern 
regimes, by gender in continental Europe and it is generally lower in the Nordic regimes. 
Overall, young and female low service functionaries are the most disadvantaged groups on all 
three variables. Unemployment is strongly linked to skill-levels, while atypical work and part-time 
employment depends less on skills and more on gender. The resulting “map of dualization” is 
the displayed in table 2. 
 
Table 2: The map of dualization: outside re regimes   insiders and  rs in the four welfa
 
Two main insights result from this section: first, there are variations in the actual composition of 
insiders and outsiders across regimes, which must be acknowledged if we want to analyze the 
determinants of individual welfare preferences. It does not make sense to expect the same 
preferences from a 30-year old part-time employed female librarian (a socio-cultural 
professional) in Sweden and in Italy, because the two do not face the same economic and 
social risks and opportunity structures. The second insight is that both insiders and outsiders -
both the A-and B-team of post-industrial economies (Esping-Andersen, 1999b) – are 
heterogeneous in terms of skills. Dualization affects not only low-skilled workers. There are both 
and high-and low-skilled outsiders and this is likely to impact on 
evelop in the next section.  
high-and low-skilled insiders 
their preferences, as we will d
                                                        
8 Except for capital accumulators and mixed service functionaries, which are considered insiders by definition.  
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Hypotheses: Dualization and welfare preferences  
Analyzing the dualization of post-industrial economies can be relevant for different reasons. The 
focus of labor market economists working on insider-outsider divides was mostly to assess the 
preferences of these workers with regard to very specific issues related to their work contracts, 
employment preferences and so on (e.g. Lindbeck, Snower, 2001, St. Paul, 1998; 2002). In a 
more political vein, it can be important to explain preferences on labor market policy, such as 
employment protection (e.g. Emmenegger, 2009; Rueda 2005). One may, however, want to go 
further and ask whether dualization may become a political dividing line, influencing the type of 
policies people advocate more generally, whether and how they organize (see Häusermann, 
Schwander, 2009) and who they vote for (Häusermann, Walter, 2010). Or one may even want 
to predict the policy positions of collective actors, such as parties and trade unions, from the 
individual-level preferences of their constituencies (Rueda, 2006; Häusermann, 2010). All these 
questions are steps in an analysis of the political implications of dualized societies. In a political 
science perspective, the question is ultimately whether differences in preference-profiles 
become politicized – meaning politically recognized –, whether they are mobilized, and whether 
they have an effect on politics and policies.  
In this paper, we want to explain the preferences of insiders and outsiders with regard to welfare 
states. We argue that they want different kinds of welfare, because they have different needs. If 
the differences in their preferences are strong enough, they may indeed become mobilized 
politically, but this is not the topic of this paper. For the formulation of hypotheses on the welfare 
state preferences of insiders and outsiders, we introduce an additional determinant, which is 
education or skill. In fact, the theoretical and empirical identification of insiders and outsiders in 
terms of unemployment, part-time employment and atypical employment above has shown that 
“outsiderness” affects not only low-but also high-skilled groups (This finding is consistent with 
the recent literature, see Polavieja, 2005; Davidsson, Nacyk, 2009: 6). Imagine a 30-year old 
part-time high school teacher who is a single mother, a freshly graduated freelance architect 
who goes from one small, temporary project to the next, or a divorced 50-year old unemployed 
supermarket cashier: Despite their different work situations and skill-levels, all of them are 
“typical” outsiders. What they share is the fact that their occupational situation may imply 
negative consequences for their economic and social rights. Apart from that, however, they are 
very likely to differ in their precise preferences. The high school teacher needs day care to be 
able to work and earn more, the architect needs a stable job and the super-market cashier 
needs social benefits that compensate her lack of contribution-payments. Hence, despite being 
outsiders, they may not have the same political preferences (see also Kitschelt, Rehm, 2006 on 
the heterogeneity of outsiders). Hence, we distinguish between high-and low-skilled insiders 
and outsiders when developing our hypotheses on their preferred type of welfare.  
With regard to the distinction between insider-and outsider-preferences, it is straightforward to 
assume that outsiders should oppose the equivalence principle of the social insurance welfare 
state. The equivalence principle lies at the heart of the continental welfare state (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; van Kersbergen, 1995), but it is present in any social insurance. It means that 
benefits are strictly proportional to contributions. Those who contribute more get more and those 
who – for whatever reason – do not accumulate a full contribution-record will get lower benefits 
or are not entitled at all. Consequently, social insurance welfare states are strongly linked to 
employment (Palier, Bonoli, 1998) and this is – for obvious reasons – exactly what penalizes 
outsiders. Bridgen and Meyer (2008) have shown that all types of outsiders, both low-and high-
skilled service employees as well as precarious blue-collar workers have particularly low social 
rights in social insurance systems. Insider, to the contrary, benefit from the equivalence 
principle, because it is tailored precisely for their standard work biographies, it reproduces 
stratification and accentuates the existing distribution of resources. Hence, we hypothesize that 
outsiders want a welfare state, which reallocates opportunities and resources either by 
redistribution or by investments in education and employability. On the other hand, insiders want 
a welfare state that protects the existing distribution through social insurance or non-
intervention.  
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Table 3: Hypotheses on the preferred welfare model 
 Insiders  Outsiders 
High-skilled  Liberal market model  Social investment model 
Low-skilled  Social protection model  Redistribution model 
 
We expect that high-skilled insiders have a strong preference for the liberal market model, 
which relies on non-intervention and distributes social and economic advantages based on the 
performance in the labor market. High-skilled outsiders, by contrast, should have a strong 
preferences for what Lister (2004) called the “social investment state”, i.e. an enabling welfare 
state which encourages the “commodification” of individuals by investing in education, in child 
care infrastructure, activation etc. Low-skilled insiders are the main constituency of the industrial 
welfare state. The social insurance schemes, such as pensions and unemployment insurance, 
were built by them and with them in mind. Therefore, we expect that they should prefer a 
welfare state based on social insurance and protection of existing distributions. Low-skilled 
outsiders, by contrast, should prefer a welfare state that has a strong accent on redistribution. 
Indeed, low-skilled outsiders have neither the education nor the employment biography to 
accumulate enough earnings or social rights by and for themselves. They depend on the 
redistribution of resources. We hypothesize also that the “opposite” group should have the 
weakest preference for the model in question. So, high-skill insiders should be least in favor of 
the redistribution model, whereas low-skilled insiders should be least in favor of the social 
investment model. The other two groups experience contrasting influences by skills and 
dualization and thus we expect their preferences to lie in between.  
 
 
2. Data, operationalization, and method  
 
In the empirical part of this paper we examine the preferences of insiders and outsiders 
regarding different welfare state models and contrast our new operationalization with the 
standard operationalization in terms of labor market status. The analysis relies on data from the 




Dependent variables  
We have four dependent variables, corresponding to the four welfare state models shown in 
table 3. We operationalized the four models on the basis of questions in the data set that we 
considered related to a particular welfare model. For each model, we performed a factor 
analysis on the selected variables, in order a) to test whether they reflect a single underlying 
dimension and b) to save the factor scores as the values of our dependent variables. 
Consequently, all our dependent variables are standardized factors. For the preferences on the 
liberal market model, we selected measures of spending preferences with regard to pensions 
and unemployment. People who support cuts in spending advocate the liberal model. 
Preferences for the social investment model are measured by the factor scores measuring 
approval that the government should finance projects to create new jobs, preferences for more 
spending on education and support for more financial help to students. All three variables reflect 
the idea of investing in education and employability, rather than compensating non-employment 
and reducing inequalities ex post. Measuring the social protection model turned out rather 
difficult, because there are no questions asking explicitly about social insurance as opposed to 
redistribution. We included variables that reflect the traditional post-war social insurance welfare 
state, by including variables measuring attitudes on spending for pensions and unemployment 
the government’s role in providing a decent standard of living for  and questions with regard to 
                                                        
9 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finnland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States  
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the elderly and the unemployed. All these questions reflect attitudes on “insuring” people’s living 
standard in case of the advent of a risk. In addition, we included the question asking 
respondents if they are in favour of goverment support to declining industries to protect jobs. 
The idea is that all five variables measure the protection of the industrial model of welfare. 
Preferences for the redistribution model are measured on the basis of two questions asking 
respondents if the government is responsible for providing a job for everyone and whether it is 
the government’s responsability to reduce income difference between rich and poor. Both are 
straightforward measures of redistributive policies. We recoded all variables so that higher 
values mean higher preferences for the corresponding welfare state model. Table 4 shows the 
operationalizations of the four welfare state models.  
 
Table 4: Operationalizations of dependent variables  
Welfare state model  Variables and factor loadings  Factor analysis 
results (pcf, unrotated) 
Liberal market model  V22: Government should spend less 
on old age pensions (0.83) 
V23: Government should spend less 
on unemployment benefits (0.83) 
Retained factors: 1 
EV: 1.41 
N: 21’848 
Social investment model  V12: Government should finance 
projects to createnew jobs (0.68) 
V20: Government should spend 
more on education (0.69)  
V32: It’s the government's 
responsability to give financial help 
to students (0.73) 
Retained factors: 1 
EV: 1.46  
N: 21’412 
Social protection model  V15: Government should support 
declining industries to protect jobs 
(0.56) 
V22: Government should spend 
more money on old age pensions 
(0.69) 
V23: Government should spend 
more money on unemployment 
benefits (0.74) 
V28: Ist the government's 
responsability to provide a decent 
standard of living to the old (0.65) 
V30: It’s the government's 
responsibility to provide a decent 
standard of living to the unemployed 
(0.72) 
Retained factors: 1 
EV: 2.3  
N: 20’230 
Redistribution model  V25: It’s the government's 
responsibility to provide a job for 
everyone (0.84) 
V31: It’s the government's 
responsibility to reduce income 
differences between rich and poor 
(0.84) 
Retained factors: 1 
EV: 1.43  
N: 21’367 
 
Independent variables  
To compare the operationalization of insiders and outsiders based on socio-structural groups 
with the standard operationalization of dualization based on current employment status, we 
construct an outsider dummy variable. Outsiders are members of social groups that are 
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overproportionally affected by atypical employment, part-time employment and unemployment 
as shown in section 1.2. (and appendix 2 and 3). We consider those socio-structural groups as 
outsiders, which are over proportionally affected by at least 2 of these forms of precarity. All 
other socio-structural groups are coded as insiders. Since this measure is new and one of the 
main contributions of this paper, we provide table 5 below with descriptive information on the 
distribution of individuals in the different categories.  
We contrast this operationalization with the standard measure that relies on the current 
employment status (Rueda, 2005; 2006; Emmenegger, 2009). Following this literature, 
unemployed, part-time or atypically employed respondents are coded 1 as outsiders, while full 
time employed are coded as insiders. Students and retirees, permanently disabled or non 
employed are excluded from the outsider operationalization. For details on operationalizations, 
see appendix 2.  
As argued in section 1.3, we introduce the skill level as an additional determinant in order to 
exame welfare policy preferences because outsiderness affects not only low-skilled but also 
high-skilled groups. We measure skill in two different ways: the first relies on the ISCO codes 
and the second is based on the highest completed degree. The ISCO-based measure reflects 
whether the individual is working in a high skilled job, while the degree-measure reflects 
education in a more narrow sense. The two measures are linked (r=0.4) but not identical and we 
chose to display the results for both measures. A detailed operationalization of the two skill 
variables can again be found in appendix 2.  
Based on our measures of insiders/outsiders and of skill levels, we constructed dummy 
variables for our four relevant groups: high-skilled insiders, high-skilled outsiders, low-skilled 
insiders and low-skilled outsiders.  
In all models, we include income, church attendance, if a person lives in couple household and 
if a person is unemployed or retired as control variables. To control for country-specific 
differences in the level of approval towards social and economic policy intervention, we also 
include country dummies. Detailed operationalization is documented in appendix 2.  
 
Table 5: Operationalization of insiders and outsider across regimes 
      Liberal Nordic  Continental  Southern  cont. 
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Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 01/2011  13S. Häusermann, H. Schwander – Who are the outsiders and what do they want? 
3. Empirical Analysis  
 
The goal of this empirical analysis is twofold: on the one hand, we want to investigate if insiders 
and outsiders hold different welfare preferences. On the other hand, we want to compare the 
explanatory power of our class-based dualization-measure with the standard measure based on 
current labor market status. We proceed in two steps. In a first section, our focus is on the 
comparison of the two operationalizations of dualization. In the second section, we add skill-
levels to the picture and investigate whether the preferences of different post-industrial labor 
market groups with regard to the liberal market model, the social investment model, the social 
protection model and the redistributive welfare model.  
 
Comparing different measures of dualization  
Table 6 displays the estimates for the determinants of welfare policy preferences. For all four 
welfare policy models, we present the estimates of the new operationalization of dualization 
based on class (M1) and the estimates for the standard operationalization based on labor 
market status (M2).  
 
Table 6: Determinants of preferences for welfare policy  
Dependent variable
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Outsider (class) -0.102**                 0.100***                 0.112***                 0.158***                
(0.04)                 (0.02)                    (0.03)                 (0.03)                   
Outsider (lm status) 0.003 0.044    -0.073**  0.010   
(0.04) (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.04)   
Income 0.106*** 0.12*** -0.061*** -0.073*** -0.166*** -0.203*** -0.133*** -0.152***
(0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02) (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.02)   
Church attendance 0.017*** 0.015*** -0.014*   -0.011    -0.001 0.006    -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Living in a couple household 0.030 0.047* -0.021    -0.015    -0.055** -0.061**  -0.031    -0.040*  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)   
Unemployment -0.337***-0.360*** 0.085    0.065    0.195*** 0.253*** 0.362*** 0.365***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.05) (0.05)    (0.07)    (0.06)   
Retired 0.216***                 -0.011    0.053                 0.152***
(0.04)                 (0.04)    (0.04)                 (0.04)   
Constant 0.224*** -0.296*** 0.395*** 0.433*** -0.182*** 0.004    0.033    0.135** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)    (0.07)    (0.06) (0.06)    (0.05)    (0.05)   
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R
2 0.134 0.122 0.156 0.162 0.191 0.203 0.252 0.252
N 13529 10414  14212    10860 14147 10778  13497 10333
Values in parentheses are standard errors. The results include regional weights. *** = significant at the 0.001 level; **= significant at the 
0.005 level; *= significant at the 0.01 level, Data: ISSP 2006 RoG IV
Liberal Social  investment Redistribution Protection
 
The results for our class-measure of outsiders-status show that outsiders are significantly more 
critical of the liberal market model than insiders, and they are clearly more supportive of the 
investment model, the redistribution model and the protection model than insiders. All these 
results confirm our expectations. Outsiders are more vulnerable to economic risks than insiders 
and therefore, they are more supportive of state intervention. Their support for social investment 
and redistribution can be explained by the fact that their specific needs and risk biographies are 
not taken adequately into account by the industrial welfare state. The only somewhat puzzling 
result is that the difference of support for the social protection model is equally strong. Since the 
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traditional social insurance welfare state was built for insiders, we would have expected less 
stark differences in the preferences of insiders and outsiders. However, the result may be 
explained by the overall stronger preferences for state intervention by outsiders.  
Table 6 provides two important results for our paper. The first result is that insiders and 
outsiders indeed differ in their preferences with regard to welfare states. Dualization is a 
relevant socio-structural conflict line. The second important result deals with the comparison of 
our class-measure of outsiders and the standard labor market measure. When we 
operationalize dualization with current labor market status, it has a much lower explanatory 
power. For three welfare state models (liberal market model, social investment model, social 
protection model), insiders and outsiders do not differ in their preferences. While this may be a 
perfectly sensible result with regard to social protection (see above), it is difficult to explain when 
it comes to the liberal market and the social investment model. The most intriguing result, 
however, refers to the redistribution model. Here, currently un-and atypically employed people 
(considered outsiders in the standard literature) seem to want significantly less redistributive 
state intervention than insiders, which goes against our expectations. We intepret these results 
as evidence in favor of our class-based operationalization of dualization. The class-based 
indicator seems to have a better discriminating and explanatory power in predicting the welfare 
state preferences of insiders and outsiders than the standard operationalization relying on 
current employment status.  
 
Preferences for different models of welfare states  
Section 3.1. has shown that insiders and outsiders differ in their welfare preferences. However, 
we suggest that welfare preferences in a post-industrial economy are not only structured by a 
different insertion in the labor market, but also by skill-levels. Just as insiders and outsiders 
“need” a different type of welfare state, high-and low-skilled workers are supposed to support 
different types of state intervention. As developed above (section 1.3),we expect high-skilled 
outsiders to be supportive of the social investment model, and low-skilled outsiders to be 
supportive of the redistribution model. Similarly, we expect high-skilled insiders to prefer the 
liberal market model, while the low-skilled insiders should support the social protection model.  
To test the pertinence of these hypotheses, we defined four groups (high-skilled insiders, low-
skilled insiders, high-skilled outsiders and low-skilled outsiders) and we examine their 
preferences for the different models. We investigate each dependent variable separately. For 
each type of welfare (as dependent variables), we provide four estimated models: M3 and M4 
present the results that we obtain when using our class-based measure of outsiders. In M3, 
high-and low-skilled insiders and outsiders are distinguished by means of the job-based 
measure of skills (based on isco-codes), where as in M4, the degree is used to distinguish high-
and low-skilled respondents. We present the results for both measures of skills for robustness 
reasons, but there is not specific theoretical expectation attached to the two measures. M5 and 
M6 are calculated with the standard operationalization of insiders and outsiders based on labor 
market status. Again, M5 and M6 differ with regard to the skill level measure used.  
As before, retirees are included as a control variable in M3 and M4 (they are left out per 
definitionem in M5 and M6 due to the outsider-definition) and the estimates for the country 
dummies are not shown. In each model, we use as the reference category the socio-structural 
group for which we expect the lowest values. Hence, we are mainly interested in three results to 
test our hypotheses: first, we want to test whether the group for which we assumed to strongest 
preference for the particular model in question actually has the highest level of support. Second, 
if our hypotheses are correct (meaning that the reference category has the lowest level of 
support for the model in question), the estimates for the other three groups should all be 
positive. Third, we want again to compare the results with our class-measure of dualization to 
the standard-measure based on labor market status.  
Table 7 provides the results for the determinants of preferences for the liberal market model. 
Low-skilled outsiders are used as reference category, because they are the most vulnerable 
category and we expect them to be least in favor of this model that privileges nonintervention. 
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We expect high-skilled outsiders to be most favorable to this model, because they have both the 
educational resources and the labor market access to be relatively independent of market-
correcting state intervention.  
 
Table 7: Determinants of preferences for the liberal market model. OLS regressions. Low-skilled 
outsiders are the base category.  





Skills:  job 
M4 
Outsider: class 




Skills:  job 
M6 
Outsider: lm status 
Skills:  degree 
High-skilled 
insider 0.325***  0.347***  0.177***  0.253*** 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)    
High-skilled 
outsider 0.171***  0.218***  0.154*** 0.251*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)    
Low-skilled 
insider  0.067**  0.083***  -0.050  0.018    
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)    
Income 0.014***  0.016***  0.012***  0.013*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    
Church 
attendance 0.023 0.034  0.046*  0.054**   
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)    
Couple household  -0.319***  -0.325***  -0.345***  -0.331*** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)    
Unemployment 0.076***  0.087***  0.091***  0.102*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)    
Retired  -0.223***  -0.183***                    
  (0.04)  (0.03)                    
Constant -0.330***  -0.503***  -0.290*** -0.495*** 
  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)    
Country fixed 
effects yes  yes  yes  Yes 
    
R
2  0.136 0.137  0.124  0.125 
N 13561  14471  9849  11024   
Values in parentheses are standard errors. The results include regional weights. *** = 
significant at the 0.001 level; **= significant at the 0.005 level; *= significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The results confirm our expectations: M3 and M4 show that high-skilled insiders are indeed 
significantly more supportive of the liberal market model than low-skilled outsiders and they 
have the highest values of support of all groups. This result holds true for all four estimated 
models. Second, M4 and M5 show that all three groups have significantly more favorable 
preferences for the liberal model than our reference group. The results do not differ much 
whether we use the job-or the degree-based measure of skills. In both models, the rank order is 
the same: high-skilled outsiders have the second highest values of support and low-skilled 
insiders the third highest. Both dualization and skill-levels play a role. The clear-cut rank-
ordering of preferences can also be seen when looking at the predicted preferences for the 
liberal market model (see appendix 4).  
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The third important point in table 7 refers to the comparison of M3 and M4 with M5 and M6. It 
seems that if we use the measure of outsiders based on current labor market status, support for 
the liberal market model becomes purely structured by skill-levels. The high-skilled (both in-and 
outsiders) are more supportive than the low-skilled, which do not split in two groups anymore. 
Again, we interpret this result as showing that the class-based measure has a stronger 
discriminating and explanatory value than the standard measure.  
Table 8 provides the estimates for the social investment model. Here, we expected high-skilled 
outsiders to be the most favorable and low-skilled insiders to be most critical (which is why they 
are the reference category).  
 
Table 8: Determinants of preferences for the social investment model. OLS regressions. Low-
skilled insiders are the base category.  





Skills:  job 
M4 
Outsider: class 








Skills:  degree 
High-skilled 
insider  -0.090**  -0.033     -0.048*  -0.028    
  (0.03)  (0.04)     (0.03)  (0.04)    
High-skilled 
outsider  0.062*  0.109**   -0.002  0.046    
  (0.03)  (0.04)     (0.05)  (0.06)    
Low-skilled 
outsider  0.048*  0.035     0.035  -0.007    
  (0.02)  (0.03)     (0.03)  (0.04)    
Income -0.050***  -0.060***  -0.064***  -0.072*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)     (0.01)  (0.01)    
Church 
attendance  -0.012*  -0.014*    -0.010  -0.011    
  (0.01)  (0.01)     (0.01)  (0.01)    
Couple household  -0.020  -0.020     -0.013  -0.015    
  (0.02)  (0.02)     (0.02)  (0.03)    
Unemployment  0.082  0.088     0.054  0.078    
  (0.07)  (0.07)     (0.08)  (0.07)    
Retired  -0.005  -0.011        
  (0.04)  (0.04)        
Constant 0.418***  0.415***  0.454***  0.452*** 
  (0.05)  (0.07)     (0.07)  (0.09)    
Country fixed 
effects yes  yes  yes  yes 
       
R
2  0.155 0.157  0.167  0.162 
N 13316  14212    9714  10860 
Values in parentheses are standard errors. The results include regional weights. *** = 
significant at the 0.001 level; **= significant at the 0.005 level; *= significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The results again clearly confirm our first hypothesis. Both in M3 and M4, High-skilled outsiders 
are the most favorable to social investment (education, creation of jobs, funding for students) of 
all groups, and they are significantly more favorable to this model than low-skilled insiders, 
regardless of the measure of skill-level used.  
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The evidence is more mixed with regard to the second hypothesis, according to which low 
skilled insiders are least favorable to the social investment model. In both models, by contrast, it 
is the high-skilled insiders who show the lowest support for the social investment. Also, the 
difference between insiders and outsiders is small among the low-skilled, especially when we 
measure skill-levels with degrees (see also the same pattern in the predicted probabilities for 
Germany, appendix 4). Hence, preferences for investment on education and employability seem 
to be structured along a line that divides the “winners” (high-skilled insiders) and the rest of the 
workforce, the interesting result being that high-skilled outsiders indeed support social 
investment clearly more than low-skilled insiders. This can be explained by the fact that given 
their unstable work biographies, they favor state intervention to re-allocate resources and 
opportunities, but they want them to be reallocated “ex ante”, i.e. at the level of employability 
rather than redistribution.  
When we measure dualization on the basis of labor market status, rather than class, the results 
are less clear. The only consistent result is again that high-skilled insiders are more skeptical of 
investment than the other groups, but contrary to our expectations, we find no noticeable 
difference between high-skilled outsiders and low-skilled insiders.  
Table 9 shows the determinants of preferences for the social protection model. Here, we used 
the high-skilled outsiders as the reference category, because we expect them to be least 
favorable to a model that re-allocates welfare ex post based on the equivalence principle. We 
expect low-skilled insiders to be the group most supportive of this kind of welfare provision, 
since it reflects the industrial welfare state that was built precisely for their needs.  
 
Table 9: Determinants of preferences for the social protection model. OLS regressions. High-
skilled outsiders are the base category.  





Skills:  job 
M4 
Outsider: class 




Skills:  job 
M6 
Outsider: lm status 
Skills:  degree 
High-skilled 
insider  -0.238***  -0.211***  -0.037  -0.022    
  (0.03)  (0.04)     (0.03)  (0.05)    
Low-skilled 
insider  0.043  0.074*    0.200***  0.222*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)     (0.05)  (0.06)    
Low-skilled 
outsider  0.137***  0.171*** 0.170*** 0.243*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)     (0.04)  (0.06)    
Income  -0.101***  -0.113*** -0.121*** -0.134*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)     (0.02)  (0.02)    
Church 
attendance  -0.014***  -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)     (0.00)  (0.00)    
Couple household  -0.023  -0.036*    -0.038  -0.050**  
  (0.02)  (0.02)     (0.02)  (0.02)    
Unemployment  0.350***  0.354*** 0.361*** 0.337*** 
  (0.07)  (0.07)     (0.07)  (0.06)    
Retired 0.163***  0.119***     
  (0.04)  (0.04)        
Constant 0.045  0.169***  -0.014  0.104**   
  (0.03)  (0.03)     (0.04)  (0.04)    
Country  fixed  yes  yes yes yes 
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effects 
       
R
2  0.264  0.263 0.264 0.262 
N  12648  13497   9252  10333  
Values in parentheses are standard errors. The results include regional weights. *** = 
significant at the 0.001 level; **= significant at the 0.005 level; *= significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The results diverge quite substantially from our expectations, however. Low-skilled outsiders, 
rather than low-skilled insiders are the group that seems to be most favorable to the social 
protection model. In both models M3 and M4, the low-skilled outsiders are clearly more 
supportive of it than the reference group, in contrast to the low-skilled insiders, who do not 
diverge significantly from the reference group. Also, high-skilled insiders are clearly more 
skeptical towards this model than high-skilled outsiders. This pattern corresponds to the one we 
find when we look at the predicted probabilities (appendix 4). The result is counterintuitive: why 
would low-skilled outsider be so supportive of the social protection model, given that they do not 
have full-scale access to precisely this insurance system? We have two possible explanations. 
It could be that the respondents do not think in terms of insurance vs. redistribution. Low-skilled 
outsiders would support this model because it promises generally “more welfare” and they think 
they will benefit from it. They may just not be aware that social insurance is not the best answer 
to their specific needs. The second possibility relates to the measure we used. Our social 
protection model is operationalized on the basis of spending preferences for the elderly and the 
unemployed and on the role of the state in securing the decent living standard of these groups 
and in supporting declining industries. These questions do not explicitly ask about the way in 
which income should be (re)distributed towards the elderly and the unemployed. We assumed 
that these questions reflect the social insurance idea, because pensions and unemployment 
insurance are the classical pillars of the social insurance regime. However, the respondents 
may have understood this in terms of a more general responsability of the government that 
involves redistribution. This would also explain why the high-skilled insiders are so critical to this 
model. In order to control for this difficulty, we also tested a narrower version of the social 
protection model, measuring it only on the basis of attitudes towards government support for 
declining industries to protect jobs, since this question captures the idea of social protection 
very precisely. However, the results are again very similar. Low-skilled outsiders are also more 
supportive of support for declining industries than low-skilled insiders. The only explanation we 
find for this is the generally higher vulnerability of low-skilled outsiders, which makes them more 
favorable to any kind of state intervention.  
Again, we examined the difference to the standard operationalization of dualization. M5 and M6 
at first glance seem to be more in line with our expectations, because low-skilled insiders are 
indeed significantly more favorable to social protection than high-skilled outsiders, while the 
latter do not differ much from the high-skilled insiders. At a second glance, however, it becomes 
clear that M5 and M6 simply indicate a skill-level difference, with the low-skilled being more 
favorable to social protection than the high-skilled. Dualization does not seem to matter in 
theses models. These findings correspond to the results of Emmenegger (2009: 140) who found 
no evidence for an insider/outsider cleavage regarding job protection (using the labor market 
status operationalization). Again, we arrive at more evidence for the relevance of dualization 
when using the class-based operationalization.  
Finally, we look at the determinants of preferences for the redistribution model in table 10. Here, 
the results are again entirely in line with our expectations. We used the high-skilled insiders as 
the reference group, because we expect the least support for redistribution from them, and we 
hypothesized that the low-skilled outsiders should be most favorable to this type of welfare.  
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Table 10: Determinants of preferences for the redistribution model. OLS regressions. High-
skilled insiders are the base category.  





Skills:  job 
M4 
Outsider: class 




Skills:  job 
M6 
Outsider: lm status 
Skills:  degree 
High-skilled 
outsider  0.181***  0.167***  -0.063  -0.054    
  (0.03)  (0.03)     (0.04)  (0.04)    
Low-skilled 
insider  0.311***  0.315*** 0.236*** 0.276*** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)     (0.04)  (0.03)    
Low-skilled 
outsider  0.371***  0.370*** 0.171*** 0.203*** 
  (0.04)  (0.05)     (0.05)  (0.05)    
Income  -0.129***  -0.144*** -0.169*** -0.182*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)     (0.02)  (0.02)    
Church 
attendance  -0.000  -0.000     0.007  0.008    
  (0.01)  (0.01)     (0.01)  (0.01)    
Couple household  -0.045**  -0.061**   -0.055**  -0.072*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)     (0.02)  (0.02)    
Unemployment  0.179***  0.182*** 0.210*** 0.226*** 
  (0.05)  (0.05)     (0.06)  (0.05)    
Retired  0.061  0.015        
  (0.04)  (0.04)        
Constant  -0.425***  -0.268***  -0.194***  -0.060    
  (0.05)  (0.06)     (0.06)  (0.07)    
Country fixed 
effects  yes  yes yes yes 
       
R
2  0.204  0.205 0.210 0.215 
N  13256  14147   9637  10778  
Values in parentheses are standard errors. The results include regional weights. *** = 
significant at the 0.001 level; **= significant at the 0.005 level; *= significant at the 0.01 level 
 
As expected, low-skilled outsiders are clearly more supportive of the redistribution model than 
high-skilled insiders in both M3 and M4, and they are consistently the most favorable group for 
the redistribution model. Moreover, high-skilled outsiders are, as expected, somewhere in the 
middle, being both more supportive than their high-skilled insider counterparts, but less so than 
the low-skilled. Low-skilled insiders, however, are only slightly less supportive of the 
redistribution model than outsiders. Hence, we do find the expected evidence for the impact of 
dualization at the level of the high-skilled, but less clearly so at the level of the low-skilled.  
The results are more difficult to understand when we use the standard measure of dualization 
based on labor market status. Here, it is not the group of low-skilled outsider, which is most 
supportive to the redistribution model, but the low-skilled insiders. This is difficult to explain in 
the light of our theoretical developments above: we expect outsiders to be more favorable to 
redistribution because this is precisely the type of welfare they need, whereas insiders can rely 
on social insurance and employment protection to a larger extent. Among the high-skilled, we 
find no evidence of the impact of dualization when using the standard measure: the high-skilled 
outsiders do not differ significantly from the high-skilled insiders in their preferences to the 
redistribution model. We argue that our results make more sense theoretically and that the weak 
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evidence based on the labor market measure of dualization may result form the difficulties of 
this measure as discussed in the first part of this paper.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
We see three main contributions of this paper. The first contribution is the theoretical 
development and empirical testing of a new conceptualization and operationalization of insiders 
and outsiders, which combines attributes of class, gender and age to form theoretically and 
empirically meaningful risk groups. We argue that political preferences are formed on the basis 
of stable characteristics, which is why we should base the definition of insiders and outsiders on 
employment biographies, rather than on a momentaneous labor market status. People 
experience specific risks, precarity, vulnerability depending on their stable occupational profile 
and this is the ground on which they develop welfare preferences. Hence, we defined a set of 
risk groups and examined to what extent they are affected by atypical employment, 
unemployment and part-time employment in different welfare regimes. All the individuals in 
those groups which are (as a group) particularly affected by theses forms of precariousness are 
defined as outsiders, the others are considered insiders. Hence, individuals are categorized on 
the basis of group-characteristics, not individual characteristics.  
The second contribution of this paper is that we tested the explanatory power and validity of our 
class-based measure of dualization against the standard measure found in the literature, which 
is based on the current labor market status of the respondent only. Both in our analyses of 
dualization only, and in the combined analyses of dualization and skills, our measure is a 
stronger predictor of insider/outsider-differences and it provides theoretically more meaningful 
results, which conform more closely with our hypotheses. This means that if our hypotheses are 
indeed theoretically plausible, the class-based measure of dualization performs better than the 
labor market measure. However, our measure has obviously a problem of complexity. Not only 
do we need detailed data on the occupational profile of respondents (isco-codes), but in this 
paper, we even operationalized insiders and outsiders depending on actual, empirical 
disadvantage. This is a far more complex and complicated way of measuring the concept than 
by looking at the current labor market status. The question is whether the additional complexity 
is justified in the light of the explanatory power we gain from it. We would argue that it is, but we 
also recognize that the data needed to operationalize insiders and outsiders as we did is lacking 
in many surveys. Consequently, it may be useful to take a step back and (re-)simplify our 
measure, by replacing some of the complex class-data by proxies or shortcuts. We have, e.g., 
seen that in all regimes, female low service functionaries are consistently outsiders and in most 
of them, even female socio-cultural professionals are structurally disadvantaged. This could be 
easily approximated by simply coding female service sector employees as outsiders. Similar 
simple approximations can be used to take into account the age-bias of dualization in Southern 
Europe and the gender-bias of dualization in continental Europe. All these approximations 
would contribute to arriving at a measure of dualization that is both theoretically meaningful and 
relatively easy to implement.  
The third and most important contribution of this paper is, however, that dualization is indeed a 
new relevant conflict line in post-industrial economies. Insiders and outsiders want different 
types of welfare to different degrees. Outsiders are more vulnerable than insiders, and the 
support consistently more state intervention than insiders. In addition to dualization, skill-levels 
are an important intervening variable when explaining post-industrial welfare preference 
patterns. High-skilled workers have more educational resources to “earn” their welfare through 
employment. Hence, if they claim state intervention, they favor rather investments in education 
and employability than a compensation of lacking income. We tested the preferences of low-and 
high-skilled insiders, as well as low-and high-skilled outsiders on four models of welfare and 
found ample support for the fact that the models tend to be most supported by the group to 
whose needs it replies most directly. High-skilled insiders are more supportive than the other 
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groups on the liberal market model, while high-skilled outsiders have the strongest preferences 
for the social investment model and low-skilled outsiders are the “champions” of redistribution. 
The only puzzling result in this respect is that the low-skilled outsiders are also the most 
supportive group when it comes to social protection. This is surprising because the social 
insurance welfare state was precisely not built for them (and in many countries actually directly 
contributes to their status as outsiders). We hypothesized that the respondents do not really see 
the difference between insurance/social protection and redistribution, and that low-skilled 
outsiders just generally favor more state intervention, given their vulnerable situation on the 
labor market.  
Whether we use a measure of skill based on the qualifications required in the respondent’s job 
or a measure based on degree, we find evidence for the impact of dualization on welfare 
preferences (either among the high-skilled or among the low-skilled or both) with regard to all 
four dependent variables. The distinction between a workforce fully integrated in the labor 
market and a more precarious, vulnerable part of the workforce is empirically validated and we 
see a picture of socio-structurally identifiable groups with distinct preferences. What remains is 
the question of mobilization. Do or will insiders and outsiders mobilize? Along the line of 
dualization or skills or both? Can there be specific alliances based on outsider-status across 
skill-levels, e.g. for social investment policies or for redistributive policies? These are some of 
the questions that are key to the next steps in the research on dualization. For this, we need to 
look not only at voting preferences of insiders and outsiders (new right? New left?) and 
membership in parties and unions, but we also have to look more closely at the political 
programs of the collective actors representing these groups, in order to determine whether 
dualization may indeed lead to a new social cleavage in post-industrial economies.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1 - Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups   
 
Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups, based on Oesch 2006 and 
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Two-digit numbers in front of job descriptions are ISCO88-2d codes. 
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Appendix 2 -  Table Operationalization 
 
VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
Liberal Model  ISSP RoGIV 2006; factor scores of PC factor analysis of 
V22 (gov. should spend less money on old age pensions), 
V23 (gov. should spend less money on unemployment 
benefits), 
Social investment model  ISSP RoGIV 2006; factor scores of PC factor analysis of 
V12 (financing projects to create new jobs) V20 
(government spending on education) and V32 
(government's responsability to give financial help to 
students) 
Redistribution model  ISSP RoGIV 2006; factor scores of PC factor analysis of 
V25 (government's responsability to provide a job for 
everyone) and V31 (government's responsability to reduce 
income differences between poor and rich) 
Social protection model  ISSP RoGIV 2006; factor scores of PC factor analysis of 
V15 (in favour or against support declining industries to 
protect jobs), V22 (government should spend more more 
on old age pensions), V23 (government should spend 
more money on unemployment benefits), V28 
(government's responsability to provide decent standard of 
living to the old) and V30 (government's responsability to 
provide decent standard of living to the unemployed) 
Classes   ISSP RoGIV 2006; ISCO-2d codes, recoded according to 
appendix 1 into CA, MSF, BC, SCP, LSF 
Outsider 1 (based on classes)  ISSP RoGIV 2006; Dummy variable measuring 
outsiderness based on classes, gender and age, recoded 
according to table 1 
Outsider 2 (based on labor 
market status) 
ISSP RoGIV 2006; Dummy variable measuring outsider 
according to emplyoment status; WRKST 1=0; WRKST 
2,3,5=1; 
Regimes  Liberal countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Great Britain, United States 
Nordic countries: Denmark, Finnland, Norway, Sweden 
Contintental countries: France, Germany, Netherlands; 
Switzerland 
Southern countries: Portugal, Spain 
Unemployment  ISSP RoGIV 2006; Dummy variable measuring 
unemployment among all other forms of work status; 
WRKST 5=1; WRKST 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10=0; 
Part-time  ISSP RoGIV 2006; Dummy variable measuring part-time 
among all other forms of work status; WRKST 2,3=1; 
WRKST 1,4,5,6,7,8,9,10=0; 
Atypical work  ISSP RoGIV 2006; Dummy variable measuring atypical 
employment (part-time, unemployed, helping family 
member, housewife/man) among all other forms of work 
status; WRKST 2,3,4, 5,8=1; WRKST 1,6,7,9,10=0; 
Education (job)  ISSP RoGIV 2006; measuring skill-levels based on ISCO 
codes. 
High-skilled are ISCO-1 <=3; low-skilled are ISCO-1 >=4; 
Education 2  (degree)  ISSP RoGIV 2006; based on highest completed education 
level ; (DEGREE); high_skilled=higher secondary 
completed (usually the degree giving access to tertiary 
education); low_skilled=below higher secondary 
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completed; 
Income   ISSP RoGIV 2006; Variable measuring the monthly mean 
income, based on national income-variables. Individuals 
are attributed the mean value of their income group 
(deciles if not specified otherwise in ISSP RoGIV 2006) in 
1000 Euros. 
Church Attendance  ISSP RoGIV 2006; based on ATTEND (how often do you 
go to church). 
Couple  ISSP RoGIV 2006; Dummy measuring if respondent lives 
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Appendix 3 – Identification of insiders and outsiders 
 
Table A 3.1: Socio-structural outsider potentials in terms of atypical work, 2006 
 Liberal  Nordic  Continental  Southern 
 N/%  %  N/%  %  N/%  %  N/%  % 
Young female 
LSF  5.6  66.4*** 6.0 43.0*** 4.9 62.8*** 9.3 38.1*** 
Young  male LSF  1.8  36.6*** 1.3  17.1  1.9  19.7  3.4  20.9*** 
Old female LSF  6.4  68.7*** 8.2 44.3*** 7.2 65.4*** 8.7 30.9*** 
Old male LSF  2.9  27.0  2.1  17.5  2.0  25.3  2.7  6.9 
                
Young female 
SCP  7.1  35.6*** 8.0  15.9  8.1  47.0*** 5.9 24.2*** 
Young male SCP  2.7  10.1  3.8  6.0  3.3  12.9  3.2  23.8*** 
Old female SCP  9.8  44.3*** 13.0 18.8*** 8.9 56.0*** 4.6  18.0 
Old male SCP  4.3  16.7  6.0  9.7  5.3  13.9  3.7  10.1 
                
Young female 
BC  1.5  48.2*** 1.1 32.4*** 1.5 47.3*** 4.2 26.6*** 
Young male BC  5.6  13.3  3.4  8.4  5.9  13.8  11.8  10.8 
Old female BC  2.0  55.7*** 1.8 29.3*** 1.5 52.6*** 4.1 34.9*** 
Old male BC  8.2  14.7  8.0  12.2  7.0  14.7  7.9  6.7 
                
MSF 18.4  37.8*** 18.8  10.6  17.5  19.7  12.8  8.5 
CA 24.0  17.7  16.5  17.0  25.2  36.8*** 17.8  17.3 
Total / mean  5764  33.5  3077  18.5  3776 34.6  266
9  19.0 
Notes: Values are group-specific frequencies. Highlighted cases indicate values that exceed 
the mean significantly at the 0.1*, 0.05** or 0.01*** level (t-test). Data source: ISSP 2006 Role 
of Government IV. 
 
Table A 3.2: Socio-structural outsider potentials in terms of parttime, 2006 
 Liberal  Nordic  Continental  Southern 
 N/%  %  N/%  %  N/%  %  N/%  % 
Young female 
LSF  5.6  29.6*** 6.0 20.7*** 4.9 39.9*** 9.3 20.5*** 
Young  male LSF  1.8  23.1*** 1.3  9.0** 1.9 12.7 3.4 7.5* 
Old female LSF  6.4  25.1*** 8.2 17.5*** 7.2 26.8*** 8.7 12.0*** 
Old male LSF  2.9  11.2  2.1  7.8  2.0  10.3  2.7  0.0 
                
Young female 
SCP  7.1  18.9*** 8.0  7.3  8.1  37.2*** 5.9 16.6*** 
Young male SCP  2.7  7.4  3.8  2.2  3.3  7.8  3.2  17.9*** 
Old female SCP  9.8  21.8*** 13.0 12.0*** 8.9 27.6*** 4.6 10.5*** 
Old male SCP  4.3  7.8  6.0  5.2  5.3  7.0  3.7  4.3 
                
Young female 
BC  1.5  15.4*** 1.1 10.6*** 1.5  12.3  4.2  3.5 
Young male BC  5.6  7.3  3.4  1.0  5.9  4.7  11.8  2.8 
Old female BC  2.0  6.6  1.8  9.3** 1.5 10.0 4.1 2.7 
Old male BC  8.2  3.9  8.0  3.8  7.0  1.6  7.9  0.5 
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MSF 18.4  18.3** 18.8  6.9  17.5 15.3 12.8  7.0 
CA 24.0  8.7  16.5  4.6  25.2  9.3  17.8  3.5 
Total / mean  5764  14.1  3077  8.4  3776 15.7  266
9  7.0 
Notes: Values are group-specific frequencies. Highlighted cases indicate values that exceed 
the mean significantly at the 0.1*, 0.05** or 0.01*** level (t-test). Data source: ISSP 2006 Role 
of Government IV. 
 
Table A 3.3: Socio-structural outsider potentials in terms of parttime, 2006 
 Liberal  Nordic  Continental  Southern 
 N/%  %  N/%  %  N/%  %  N/%  % 
Young female 
LSF  5.6  4.6*** 6.0 6.2*** 4.9 5.2*** 9.3  17.3*** 
Young  male LSF  1.8  3.9*** 1.3  1.5  1.9  5.1*** 3.4  12.9*** 
Old female LSF  6.4  2.4** 8.2 4.7*** 7.2  2.2  8.7  8.7*** 
Old male LSF  2.9  2.8*** 2.1  3.3** 2.0  6.0*** 2.7  4.2 
                
Young female 
SCP  7.1 1.2 8.0  2.0 8.1 1.3 5.9  7.6** 
Young male SCP  2.7  1.1  3.8  3.0  3.3  3.9** 3.2  6.0 
Old female SCP  9.8  1.4  13.0  1.7  8.9  1.7  4.6  3.9 
Old male SCP  4.3  1.7  6.0  1.1  5.3  1.2  3.7  2.9 
                
Young female 
BC  1.5  4.4*** 1.1 8.5*** 1.5  21.1*** 4.2 22.8*** 
Young male BC  5.6  3.8*** 3.4 5.8*** 5.9 8.5*** 11.8 7.8** 
Old female BC  2.0  1.1  1.8  3.7*** 1.5 8.7*** 4.1  14.3*** 
Old male BC  8.2  3.6*** 8.0  3.4** 7.0  5.3*** 7.9  2.7 
             
MSF 18.4  1.6  18.8  2.9  17.5  2.2  12.8  4,8 
CA 24.0  0.9  16.5  2.1  25.2  2.5  17.8  3.2 
Total / mean  5764  2.0  3077  3.1  3776 3.3  266
9  7.3 
Notes: Values are group-specific frequencies. Highlighted cases indicate values that exceed 
the mean significantly at the 0.1*, 0.05** or 0.01*** level (t-test). Data source: ISSP 2006 Role 
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